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COMPULSORY POOLING OF OIL AND GAS
INTERESTS IN NEW MEXICO
RICHARD S. MORRIS*

In 1935, the New Mexico Legislature passed the Oil Conservation Act' to
require the conservation of oil and generally to provide for the regulation of the
oil industry. Although this action followed closely the pattern of legislation
then developing in other states, notably Texas 2 and Oklahoma, 3 the New Mexico Oil Conservation Act is distinctive in being the first truly comprehensive
conservation law to be adopted in any state. The Act remains substantially unchanged today. 4
The Act defines and prohibits the waste of oil,5 requires the proration of oil
to market demand, 6 and establishes the Oil Conservation Commission 7 to administer and enforce its provisions. Among the broad powers given the Commission is the authority to establish for each oil pool the size of proration unit
which one well can efficiently and economically drain. 8 Also, the Commission
is authorized to enforce development on the size proration unit it prescribes as
standard in a pool by requiring whatever diverse interests might exist in such a
unit to join for the purpose of drilling a well."
The role of the proration unit in the orderly development of oil and gas
properties is well established. 1" But the power of compulsory pooling, by which
this orderly development may be enforced, is not well established and in many
quarters appears to be misunderstood as to both its purpose and the method by
which it is effected.
Twenty-four states, including New Mexico, now have some form of com* Member of the New Mexico bar.

1. N.M. Laws 1935, ch. 72; now N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-1 to -34 (1953).
2. Tex. Acts 4th Called Sess. 1932, ch. 2 at 3 ; Tex. Acts 1935, ch. 76 at 180.
3. Okla. Laws 1933, ch. 131.
4. For a history of this legislation see Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Legal History,
1958 at 155-57 (Sullivan ed. 1958).

5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-3 (1953), defines "waste" to include both surface and subsurface waste, as well as waste in its ordinary meaning. This section also defines waste
to be the production of oil or gas in excess of reasonable market demand, or the nonratable taking of oil.
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-2 to -3 (1953).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-4 (1953). The Commission is composed of the Governor,
the Land Commissioner, and the State Geologist.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(b) (1953).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (1953) (amended by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c)
(Supp. 1961)).

10. See Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas-A Symposium (Published by
Mineral Law Section, A.B.A., 1938) ; Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Legal History,
1948 (Murphy ed. 1949) ; Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Legal History, 1958 (Sullivan
ed. 1958).
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pulsory pooling law." In a few states, notably Oklahoma and Mississippi, the

12
compulsory pooling laws have received considerable attention in the courts.
Without exception they have been upheld against attacks of unconstitutionality. 13
In New Mexico, however, there has been no judicial recognition or interpretation of the compulsory pooling law even though it has been in effect since
1935-the year in which Oklahoma adopted its pooling law.14 The lack of New
Mexico cases involving compulsory pooling is no indication that this provision
of the law has not been invoked. Many cases have been considered by the New
Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, and they have resulted in orders requiring the pooling of oil and gas interests, and, in many of these cases, novel
legal questions have arisen.

POOLING PRIOR TO 19 6 1
A. Non-Consenting Working and Unleased Interests
New Mexico's original compulsory pooling law' 5 remained unchanged until
11. See Myers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, Voluntary-Compulsory §
8.01(4) (1957, Supp. 1961).
12. See, e.g., Patterson v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938),
appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 376 (1939) ; Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59 So.
2d 85 (1952).
13. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 434 (1954).
14. Only two cases involving orders of the Oil Conservation Commission have been
appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court. The first, Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962), 3 Natural Resources J. 178 (1963),
concerned a change of the proration formula in the Jalmat Gas Pool of Lea County, New
Mexico. The second, Sims v. Mechem, 382 P.2d 183 (N.M. 1963), concerned a change in
the configuration of a proration unit, and incidentally involved the compulsory powers
of the Commission. In Sims the court stated that the Commission has unquestionable
power to require pooling of properties where the owners have failed to agree. But the
court held the pooling order invalid since the Commission had made no finding of waste.
15.
The pooling of properties or parts thereof shall be permitted, and, if not
agreed upon, may be required in any case when and to the extent that the smallness or shape of a separately owned tract would, under the enforcement of a
uniform spacing plan or proration unit, otherwise deprive or tend to deprive
the owner of such tract of the opportunity to recover his just and equitable share
of the crude petroleum or natural gas, or both, in the pool; Provided, that the
owner of any tract that is smaller than the drilling unit that is established for
the field, shall not be deprived of the right to drill on and produce from such
tract, if same can be done without waste; but in such case, the allowable production from such tract, as compared with the allowable production therefrom if
such tract were a full unit, shall be in ratio of the area of such tract to the area
of the full unit. All orders requiring such pooling shall be upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable, and will afford to the owner of each tract in
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1961.10 It contained a provision authorizing the Commission to require pool-

ing "when and to the extent that the smallness or shape of a separately owned
tract would, under the enforcement of a uniform spacing plan or proration
unit, otherwise deprive or tend to deprive the owner of such tract of the opportunity to recover his just and equitable share of the crude petroleum or natural gas, or both, in the pool . . . ." The law further provided "that the owner
of any tract that is smaller than the drilling unit established for the field,
shall not be deprived of the right to drill on and produce from such tract, if
same can be done without waste . . ." The Commission was authorized to
adjust allowables proportionately to the size of the tract when a small tract
owner insisted on his right to develop his own property and, further, to determine costs between interests pooled by Commission orders.
The first compulsory pooling orders entered by the Commission showed a
reluctance to use the full authority of the law. In several instances the Commission required pooling but further ordered that a continuing effort be made
to secure the consent of all interests to a communitization agreement. 17 In one
case,' 8 the Commission ordered pooling but required that all interests be
signed to a communitization agreement as a condition to the effectiveness of the
order.
After the first few cases had been considered, the Commission adopted a
basic attitude toward pooling which, in most aspects, remains unchanged. In
each case inquiry is made by the Commission concerning the efforts of the
applicant for compulsory pooling to secure the consent of the interests being
pooled.' Where unleased interests are to be pooled, the reasonableness of the
offer to lease may be questioned. 20 Whether active protest to pooling is
voiced 2 1 and whether the protestant appears at the Commission hearing 22 are
the pool the opportunity to recover or receive his just and equitable share of the
oil or gas, or both, in the pool as above provided, so far as may be practicably recovered without waste. In the event such pooling is required, the costs of development and operation of the pooled unit shall be limited to the lowest actual
expenditures required for such purpose including a reasonable charge for super-

vision; and in case of any dispute as to such costs, the commission shall determine the proper costs.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (1953) (amended by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (Supp.
1961).
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (Supp. 1961). See note 41 infra.
17. See, e.g., Texas Co., Case No. 117, Order No. R-739 (N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm'n 1948).
18. C. H. Sweet, Case No. 427, Order No. R-234 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n
1952).
19. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co., Case No. 595, Order No. R-396 (N.M. Oil
Conservation Comm'n 1953).
20. Ibid.
21. See, e.g., Blackwood and Nichols Co., Case No. 566, Order No. R-357 (N.M.
Oil Conservation Comm'n 1953).
22. Ibid.
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strongly considered factors. Also, the economic feasibility of a second well on
a proration unit is considered a factor in ordering pooling, 23 and in many cases
orders have been entered based on a finding that waste would be caused by the
24
drilling of a second well on the acreage to be pooled.
An examination of these cases reveals that "waste" as used in this context
meant economic waste rather than the physical waste of oil and gas. The protection of correlative rights and the prevention of economic waste caused by
the drilling of unnecessary wells were the chief considerations in ordering
pooling, and physical waste became a factor only where it appeared that without pooling no well would be drilled to develop the proration unit.
One of the major problems of compulsory pooling in New Mexico is the
determination of costs between the operator on the one hand and the nonconsenting working interest owner or unleased interest owner on the other.
Where a working interest or an unleased interest has not agreed to voluntary
pooling and an operator seeks compulsory pooling of that interest with interests
of his own, usually amounting to most of the acreage in the proposed unit,
that operator will seek to have the interest being pooled charged with its
share of the costs of unit development and operation. The non-consenting
interest may not object to being pooled but may object to the operator's proposal for the apportionment of costs. This dispute has occurred in numerous
pooling cases 25 and is probably the reason for most cases being brought before
the Commission.
In early cases involving disputes of this nature the Commission again was
reluctant to use the full authority of the pooling law. Many orders merely
required pooling and left to the operator and the non-consenting interest owner
the problem of working out costs between them the best they could. 26 In
later cases the Commission, in its pooling orders, began providing alternative
courses of action for the non-consenter to follow. In the first case providing such
alternatives, 27 an owner of an unleased interest involuntarily pooled was allowed to share in the production from the unit from such time as he had (a)
paid his proportionate share of the well costs, or (b) made other arrangements
satisfactory to the operator. The Commission retained jurisdiction to determine
well costs in the event of a dispute. It seems apparent now, with the experience of more recent cases, that this order was inadequate to protect a non23. See note 37 infra.
24. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co., Case No. 978, Order No. R-747 (N.M. Oil
Conservation Comm'n 1956).
25. See, e.g., Saul A. Yager and El Paso Natural Gas Co., Case Nos. 1000-1001
Consol., Order No. R-795 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1956).
26. See, e.g., Blackwood and Nichols Co., Case No. 566, Order No. R-357 (N.M. Oil
Conservation Comm'n 1953).
27. Phillips Petroleum Co., Case No. 978, Order No. R-747 (N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm'n 1956).
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consenting interest owner who might have been unable to pay his share of
well costs.
Following closely on this case the Commission considered another pooling
application involving a non-consenting unleased interest.28 At the hearing the
operator proposed that the pooling order should provide the non-consenter
with the alternative of paying his share of well costs in cash or allowing recovery out of production to the extent of 150 per cent of his share. The nonconsenting interest opposed this method of allocating costs, contending that
no penalty should be assessed against him as a "carried" interest due to the
statutory requirement that the costs be "limited to the lowest actual expenditures required ....
,,29 for drilling the well. The non-consenting interest
further contended that his unleased interest should be considered seven-eighths
working interest and one-eighth royalty interest and, accordingly, that costs
should be withheld only from seven-eighths of the proceeds attributable to his
interest. The Commission's order 3 0 provided that the non-consenter pay his
share of well costs in cash within fifteen days from the date of the order or,
as an alternative, that the operator be allowed to withhold from production
attributable to the full eight-eighths of his interest 125 per cent of his share
of well costs.
The recovery of 125 per cent allowed in this order set the pattern for future
orders which pooled non-consenting working or unleased interests. Since by
statute costs were limited to "lowest actual expenditures . . . including a
reasonable charge for supervision ....
"31 the additional twenty-five per cent
must be justified as a charge for supervision. Charges for interest or for risk, although not disallowed, were not expressly authorized by the terms of the
32
statute.
So far in this discussion the cases mentioned have been those where tie
party bringing the pooling case before the Commission was an operator who
owned most of the working interest in the proposed unit and who had been
unsuccessful in leasing or communitizing the remainder. This is the typical
case for which the pooling law was created. Some cases, however, have not
fit neatly into this category; consider, for example, the following situation. 3
Upon a showing that a small unleased interest not only refused to lease or
28. Saul A. Yager and El Paso Natural Gas Co., Case Nos. 1000-1001 Consol.,
Order No. R-795 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1956).
29. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (1953) (amended by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c)
(Supp. 1961)). See note 15 su/'ra.
30. Saul A. Yager and El Paso Natural Gas Co., Case Nos. 1000-1001 Consol., Order
No. R-795 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1956).
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (1953) (amended by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c)
(Supp. 1961)). See note 15 supra.
32. See note 48 infra.
33. W. H. Swearingen, Case No. 2080, Order No. R-1748-A (N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm'n 1960).
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join an operator's proposed unit but actively opposed being pooled into the unit
on any terms, the Commission created a non-standard proration unit which
excluded the unleased interest.34 After the order was entered, but before the
unit well was drilled, the owner of the unleased interest reconsidered and applied to the Commission for an order requiring the pooling of his acreage
with the acreage previously included in the non-standard unit.
This type of an application raised several important questions: Inasmuch as
the owner of the unleased interest did not protest, but rather endorsed the
order establishing the non-standard unit which excluded his acreage, was his
pooling application a collateral attack upon the prior order? May the compulsory pooling law be invoked by an interest other than the operator who proposes to drill the unit well? Should a pooling order enforce the assumption of
dry hole risk upon the owner of a small unleased interest solely because he is
the applicant for compulsory pooling?
Little consideration was given the first two questions. The application was
heard and the dispute was narrowed to the question of how the costs and risk
of drilling the unit well should be allocated. The Commission's order allowed
the owner of the unleased interest the alternative of either paying his share of
well costs in cash by a certain date, subject to a subsequent adjustment to actual
cost, or allowing his share of well costs, plus twenty-five per cent thereof as a
charge for supervision, to be paid out of the production attributable to his entire
interest. No effective separation of the unleased interest into working and
royalty interests was recognized. A proviso was attached to the latter alternative that in the event the well was a dry hole the unleased interest should
bear its share of well costs.
The Commission evidently required the unleased interest to take the risk
of paying dry hole costs due to the absence of statutory authority to provide
for an increased percentage to be withheld from production for risk. It should
be noted that in this case there was little dry hole risk.
The practice of allowing the operator to withhold from eight-eighths of the
proceeds attributable to an unleased interest was not continued beyond this
case; in all subsequent cases involving the involuntary pooling of unleased
interests, the interests were treated as being separated into working and royalty
interests-the royalty interests were paid free of costs.
In most cases where the owner of some interest in a proposed proration unit
has opposed the pooling of his interest, such as in the last-mentioned case, the
Commission has excluded it, if practicable, and formed a non-standard unit.
Most cases of this sort have involved small, unleased interests which have opposed pooling on any terms due to their own ignorance or stubbornness, or both.
34. Charles Loveless, Case No. 2036, Order No. R-1748 (N.M. Oil Conservation

Comm'n 1960).
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Nevertheless, where opposition to pooling has amounted to something more
than passive non-consent, interests have been excluded from the unit even
though the correlative rights of the owners of those interests were impaired
by their own position.35 In some cases where it appeared that upon reconsideration the non-consenting interest would wish to join the unit, a nonstandard unit was established subject to the condition that the non-consenting
interest could join at a later time. 6
In some cases, however, substantial interests have been involuntarily pooled
over their vehement protestations. In one case,87 the working interest owner in
an eighty-acre tract sought the compulsory pooling of the unleased interest in an
adjoining eighty-acre tract to form a standard 160-acre gas proration unit. The
pooling application was brought after all of the owners of the undivided, unleased interest had been offered, and had refused, the opportunity to lease or
to join the unit voluntarily. At the hearing of the pooling application, the
owner of an undivided 17/30ths interest in the unleased eighty acres appeared
and actively protested the inclusion of his interest in the proposed unit. The
protest may have been due to the protestant's misconception of the effect of
pooling, which was fancied as some form of uncompensated confiscation, but
may have had some reasonable basis in as much as the eighty-acre tract being involuntarily pooled had better productive potential than the tract owned by
the applicant. The applicant proposed to locate the unit well on the protestant's
land after a pooling order had been entered, but there was evidence showing
that the entire 160 acres was productive of gas. There was also evidence that
a well drilled on either eighty-acre tract as a non-standard unit would be uneconomical due to the proportionately decreased allowable it would receive,
and no proposal was made by the applicant or the protestant to form two eightyacre units.
This situation presented the problem of how to protect the correlative rights
of everyone concerned and, at the same time, prevent the waste that might
occur if the lands involved were not developed. The correlative rights of
both the applicant and the protestant dictated that a well be drilled to prevent
drainage by other wells in the reservoir, yet the rights of the protestant, as
voiced by him, included the right to refuse to commit his acreage to the proposed unit.
Since there were other owners of unleased interests in the tract owned
partially by the protestant, who had not voiced active non-consent to pooling,
and since a well could not economically be drilled on an eighty-acre tract, the
35. See note 33 supra.
36. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co., Case No. 986, Order No. R-737 (N.M. Oil
Conservation Comm'n 1955).
37. Southern Union Prod. Co., Case No. 2249, Order No. R-1960 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1961).
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Commission ordered pooling as the solution best designed to protect the correlative rights of all affected parties.
The pooling order allowed the operator to withhold 110 per cent of the
proceeds attributable to seven-eighths of the non-concerning interest until the
pro rata share of well costs were paid, and required the operator to submit an
itemized schedule of well costs to the Commission. The well was drilled and
completed at a location on the protestant's eighty-acre tract with the full 160-acre
unit dedicated to the well.
B. Non-consenting Royalty Interests
No discussion has been offered, so far, of the problems involved in pooling
non-consenting royalty interests as such, considered apart from their recognition as a portion of an unleased interest. Many pooling cases considered by
the Commission have been occasioned by non-consenting royalty interests. But
few of these cases have presented any problem because in most of them, even
though the royalty owner would not consent to voluntary pooling, no objection
was made to compulsory pooling. There have been a few notable exceptions,
however.
In one case, 38 the application for compulsory pooling was opposed by royalty
owners on the grounds that (1) the Commission had no statutory authority
to require the pooling of royalty interests, (2) pooling, whether voluntary or
involuntary, was merely a lease-holding and contractual-avoidance device,
and (3) since the oil pool involved was governed merely by temporary rules
providing for eighty-acre proration units, and since the royalty owners intended
to object to the establishment of permanent rules to that effect, the pooling
of an eighty-acre unit would be prejudicial to their cause.
The Commission ordered pooling based on its standard finding that "denial
of the subject application would deprive, or tend to deprive the mineral
interest owners in the said eighty-acre tract of the opportunity to recover their
just and equitable share of the crude petroleum oil or natural gas, or both, in the
• . .Pool." 39
The contention made in this case concerning the lack of statutory authority
requiring the pooling of royalty interests had been anticipated but never raised
directly in a previous case. Its basis lay in the use of the word "owner" in the
pooling statute which is defined in another section of the conservation law in
terms relating only to a working interest. 40
The Commission managed to operate successfully under the original form
of the pooling law, and in spite of the inadequacies that appeared no litigation
38. Cities Serv. Oil Co., Case No. 2101, Order No. R-1801 (N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm'n 1960).

39. Id., Finding No. 6.
40. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-29(e) (1953).
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1961, however, the law was revised to clarify the power of the
and to remedy

41

some of

the problems

which

threatened

41.

When two [2] or more separately owned tracts of land are embraced
within a spacing or proration unit, or where there are owners of royalty
interests or undivided interests in oil and gas minerals which are separately
owned or any combination thereof, embraced within such spacing or proration
unit, the owner or owners thereof may validly pool their interests and develop
their lands as a unit. Where, however, such owner or owners have not agreed
to pool their interests, and where one such separate owner, or owners, who
has the right to drill has drilled or proposes to drill a well on said unit to a
common source of supply, the commission, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary
wells or to protect correlative rights, or to prevent waste, shall pool all or any
part of such lands or interests or both in the spacing or proration unit as a unit.
All orders effecting [affecting] such pooling shall be made after notice and
hearing, and shall be upon such terms and conditions as are just and reasonable
and will afford to the owner or owners of each tract or interest in the unit the
opportunity to recover or receive without unnecessary expense his just and fair
share of the oil or gas, or both. Each order shall describe the lands included
in the unit designated thereby, identify the pool or pools to which it applies
and designate an operator for the unit. All operations for the pooled oil or gas,
or both, which are conducted on any portion of the unit shall be deemed for
all purposes to have been conducted upon each tract within the unit by the
owner or owners of such tract. For the purpose of determining the portions of
production owned by the persons owning interests in the pooled oil or gas, or
both, such production shall be allocated to the respective tracts within the unit
in the proportion that the number of surface acres included within each tract
bears to the number of surface acres included in the entire unit. The portion
of the production allocated to the owner or owners of each tract or interest
included in a well spacing or proration unit formed by a pooling order shall,
when produced, be considered as if produced from the separately owned tract
or interest by a well drilled thereon. Such pooling order of the commission
shall make definite provision as to any owner, or owners, who elects not to
pay his proportionate share in advance for the pro rata reimbursement solely
out of production to the parties advancing the costs of the development and
operation which shall be limited to the actual expenditures required for such
purpose not in excess of what are reasonable, but which shall include a reasonable charge for supervision and may include a charge for the risk involved in
the drilling of such well, which charge for risk shall not exceed fifty per cent
[50%] of the nonconsenting working interest owner or owners' pro rata share
of the cost of drilling and completing the well.
In the event of any dispute relative to such costs, the commission shall
determine the proper costs after due notice to interested parties and a hearing
thereon. The commission is specifically authorized to provide that the owner
or owners drilling, or paying for the drilling, or for the operation of a well
for the benefit of all shall be entitled to all production from such well which
would be received by the owner, or owners, for whose benefit the well was
drilled or operated, after payment of royalty as provided in the lease, if any, applicable to each tract or interest, and obligations payable out of production, until
the owner or owners drilling or operating the well or both have been paid
the amount due under the terms of the pooling order or order settling such
dispute. No part of the production or proceeds accruing to any owner or owners
of a separate interest in such unit shall be applied toward the payment of any

its
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II
THE 1961 AMENDMENT

A. Problems Solved by the Amendment
Under the new law the pooling of royalty interests and undivided working
or unleased interests may be required. Also, when an unleased interest is
pooled, seven-eighths of the interest is considered working interest and oneeighth is considered royalty interest to be paid free of costs. The proviso in
favor of the small tract owner was written out of law, thereby eliminating
an ever present threat to the effectiveness of the pooling law.
The Commission is specifically authorized to require pooling to prevent
economic waste caused by the drilling of unnecessary wells-a basis for pooling previously recognized by the Commission but without clear statutory
foundation.
The Commission is expressly required to provide for the withholding of
proceeds from production attributable to a working interest which has not
paid its share of well costs. Such costs are limited to actual costs including
costs of supervision, as under the previous law, but costs may now be assessed for the risk involved in drilling up to an additional fifty per cent of the
non-consenting working interest's share. A provision for interest charges was
proposed, but not included in the revision.
B. Problems Created by the Amendment
The revised law eliminated many threats to the effectiveness of compulsory
pooling, but it has not proved to be a panacea for all pooling problems. New
problems have been created in the area of assessing charges for risk. The proper
determination of supervisory costs continues to be a problem, and new questions have been posed concerning the nature of compulsory pooling which would
have been applicable to the law before as well as after its revision.
Some confusion presently exists concerning the risk for which a charge may
be made and added to a non-consenting interest's share of the development
costs. The risk for which a charge properly may be made is, in the words of
the statute, "the risk involved in the drilling of such well."' 42 There are,
cost properly chargeable to any other interest in said unit.
If the interest of any owner or owners of any unleased mineral interest is

pooled by virtue of this act . . . .seven-eighths of such interest shall be considered as a working interest and one-eighth shall be considered a royalty
interest, and he shall in all events be paid one-eighth of all production from
the unit and creditable to his interest.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (Supp. 1961).
42. Ibid.
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however, at least three forms of risk inherent in every oil or gas prospect: (1)
the risk of encountering unusual and expensive mechanical problems in the
drilling of the well, (2) the risk of a dry hole, and (3) the risk of obtaining
an uneconomical well-a risk which may not be resolved for years and which
depends on such factors as market demand and the ability of the operator
of the well to make a successful technical evaluation of the reservoir.
It has been argued 43 that all three forms of risk should be considered in
fixing costs. But it cannot be ascertained from Commission orders to date
upon what basis risk is to be charged, because the specific issue has not been presented for determination. The standard Commission order finds merely, without amplification, that risk should be assessed at a certain percentage of well
44

costs.

One difficulty in assessing costs for risk as a percentage of well costs is
that there is no actual relationship between the two items. Few would argue
that risk should not be compensated for in some manner, however, and the
assessment of such costs has found general acceptance in the industry as a percentage of drilling costs. It has been shown to the Commission by those seeking fifty per cent as a risk factor that in "arms-length" transactions, i.e., communitization agreements, it is customary to provide a risk charge on "carried"
interests of 100 per cent. 45 And such charges are occasionally 20046
and even 300, 4 7 per cent of drilling costs.

It should be borne in mind that risk charges are made only against "carried"
interests, i.e., those working interests which elect to pay their proportionate
share of costs out of the proceeds from production rather than in advance of
the drilling of the well. Where a working interest owner refuses to pay his
share of costs in advance of drilling, his share of costs must be paid by the remaining working interests participating in the well. This situation, which may
result either from compulsory pooling or from agreement, causes the remaining
working interests to assume the burden of having their capital tied up for years
until well costs can be recovered as well as the burden of all of the risk involved in the drilling of the well. Without any provision in communitization
agreements or in compulsory pooling orders which allows the participating
working interests to charge the non-participating owners for interest on their
43. Southwest Prod. Co., Case Nos. 2415, 2416, 2446 and 2453 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1962) (heard de novo).
44. See, e.g., S. P. Yates, Case No. 2655, Order No. R-2339 (N.M. Oil Conservation

Comm'n 1962), in which order the maximum factor of fifty per cent was allowed.
45. See Southwest Prod. Co., Case Nos. 2415, 2416, 2446 and 2453 (N.M. Oil Con-

servation Comm'n 1962).
46. Pan American Petroleum Corp., Case No. 2500, Order No. R-2226 (N.M. Oil
Conservation Comm'n 1962).
47. Ibid.
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proportionate share of drilling costs, it is apparent that some portion of the socalled risk charge should actually be considered a charge for interest. The exact
amount of this charge cannot be fixed either before or after drilling since it
must depend upon the length of time required for well costs to be recovered
which, in turn, depends on many variable factors such as well reserves and
market demand.
Therefore, much of the clamor for an adequate risk factor is due, at least in
part, to a desire to be compensated for interest. 48 Viewed in this light, the fixing
of risk charges by the Commission would amount to an adjustment of equities
between participating and non-participating interests. If this is the aim of the
Commission, independent consideration should be given to the two factors,
49
risk and interest, and each must be assessed as realistically as possible.
Practical difficulties encountered in assessing risk and interest as separate
costs may justify the Commission's current practice, and it may be that additional legislation would be necessary to permit the assessment of interest charges
as such. In any event, charges should be assessed in such a manner as to treat
the non-consenting interest owner who must be pooled by compulsion the same,
but no better, than his counterpart who voluntarily pooled his interest but
elected to be "carried." Certainly, no incentive should be provided for an interest owner to refuse to join voluntarily in an agreement offering fair and
equitable terms because he may obtain an advantage by being pooled by order
of the Commission.
Another problem is that of assessing costs of supervision. The law provides
that charges shall be made for supervision,"0 a term which, like "risk," may
assume several forms. There are costs of supervision incurred in the drilling of
a well, and, also, there are costs involved in supervising the well throughout
its productive life.
Until recently, costs of supervision have been assessed by the Commission as
an additional percentage of well costs. 1 No attempt to fix actual costs has been
made in the Commission's orders.
If costs of supervision are to be considered as only those incidental to the
drilling of the well, they might be reasonably related to well costs and assessed
48. In Oklahoma, interest may be recovered as an item of well costs, but only if
the operator has actually paid the interest. See Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 268
P.2d 878 (Okla. 1953).
49. There is no specific provision in the pooling law allowing a charge to be made
for interest; there is, however, the general expression: "All orders effecting [affecting]
such pooling . . . shall be upon such terms and conditions as are just and reasonable
....
" N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (Supp. 1961).
50. Ibid.
51. See, e.g., Order No. R-1883 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1961), allowing
ten per cent of well costs as an additional charge for supervision.
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as a percentage. However, if costs of supervision are considered also to include
operating costs over the life of the well, then they do not appear to be reasonably related to well costs.
The orders entered by the Commission in recent pooling cases indicate a
change in its interpretation of the term "supervision." Costs now are fixed at a
certain monthly figure,5 2 and each non-consenting working interest is assessed
with its proportionate share to be paid out of production. Thus it now appears
that no consideration is being given to supervisory costs incurred in the drilling
of the well, unless the Commission is recognizing that such costs may properly
be included as well costs without being specifically recognized and authorized
as such in the pooling order. 3
Aside from those questions involving the allocation of costs, others have
arisen concerning the compulsory pooling process. In a series of cases5 4 arising
after the 1961 revision of the pooling law, the nature and operation of compulsory pooling were considered anew with questions concerning the Commission's
power and discretion in such matters.
Following hearings before an Examiner where it was shown that certain
specified interests refused to join in a proration unit, the Commission entered
its orders pooling those specific interests with the remainder of the working
interest in the proposed unit owned by the applicant.55 By specifying each interest to be pooled as to identity and amount of ownership, the Commission
departed from its previous practice of pooling "all mineral interests" within the
unit. 56

These cases were taken before the full Commission on hearings de novo
where legal, equitable and practical arguments were made for both methods of
effecting compulsory pooling. In support of specifying the interests to be pooled,
the argument was advanced that only in that way could the Commission be
reasonably sure all interests being pooled had been given the opportunity to
join, lease or sell upon fair terms. In support of pooling all interests, whatever
they might be, it was argued that only in that way could the Commission be
absolutely sure that its order would be effective to form the unit, since the possibility of error in identifying the ownership or the extent of an interest would
always be inherent in the other manner. Further, it was argued, the nature of
52. See, e.g., Order No. R-2068-B (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1962), fixing
$75.00 per month as the cost of supervision.
53. May interest (the cost of money) also be considered a proper item of well cost
and included as such by the operator without the express approval of the Commission?
See note 49 supra.
54. Southwest Prod. Co., Case Nos. 2415, 2416, 2446 and 2453 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1962).
55. Order Nos. R-2150, R-2151, R-2068-A and R-2152 (N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm'n 1961).
56. See, e.g., Order No. R-2027 (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1961).
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the proceeding, being in rem rather than in personam, would dictate the method
of effecting pooling.
As the result of the hearings de novo, the Commission entered its orders5 7
which pooled "all mineral interests, whatever they may be"' 8 in each
unit, thereby recognizing the in rem nature of the proceeding. The orders were
based, however, on findings that the applicant had made "diligent effort to
identify and to locate all owners of interest in the proposed proration unit
. . . ,"' that the applicant had made "fair and reasonable offers to lease, to
obtain quit claim deeds, or to communitize with respect to each non-consenting
interest owner whose identity and address [were] known . . . ,"6 and that, in
spite of these efforts, there remained non-consenting interests. 61
By the inclusion of these findings in the pooling orders, it is apparent that
the diligence of the applicant was a factor considered by the Commission in
ordering pooling. To what extent an applicant might relax his leasing practices,
his title search and his curative procedures and still obtain a compulsory pooling
order has not been determined. The Commission has indicated, however, that
it will demand at least "good faith" efforts in this regard, and that it will not
allow compulsory pooling to be used as a substitute for prudent leasing practices.
The proposition has been urged that the Commission has no discretion in a
pooling case-where there are non-consenting interests, they obviously "have
not agreed," 62 and the Commission must order pooling.63 This view would
deny the Commission the prerogative of refusing to order pooling if it found
evidence of imprudent leasing practices; indeed, it would deny the Commission
the right to inquire into the diligence of the applicant's efforts to form a unit
by negotiated means. It would deny to the pooling procedure any equitable
qualities, even though such procedure necessarily involves adjusting the rights
and equities of the various interests.
Such arguments notwithstanding, the Commission considers itself endowed
with equitable powers in pooling matters and continues to require a showing of
diligent effort by the applicant before ordering pooling. It should be noted,
57. Order Nos. R-2150-A, R-2151-A, R-2068-B and R-2152-A (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1962).
58. Id., para. 1.
59. Id., Finding No. 3.
60. Id., Finding No. 4.
61. Id., Finding No. 5.
62. The pooling law provides: "Where, however, such owner or owners have not
agreed to pool their interests . . . the commission . . . shall pool all or any part of such

lands or interests or both in the spacing or proration unit as a unit." N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 65-3-14(c)

(Supp. 1961).

63. In accordance with this view, see Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59
So. 2d 85 (1952).
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however, that in every case brought before the Commission upon an application
64
for compulsory pooling, pooling eventually has been ordered.
SUMMARY

From the foregoing discussion the reader may have become aware of the
basic nature of compulsory pooling in New Mexico. He may also have become
aware of certain inadequacies in the pooling law and its administration.
Some of these inadequacies might be remedied by new approaches to the
administration of the law, and others might be cured only by new legislation.
One thing is certain: new problems will continue to arise and old problems will
assume new forms. The solutions to these problems will continue to come from
the petroleum industry and those charged with the administration of the law.
If these problems are resolved by the application of equitable principles and by
the determination, in each case, of the reasonableness of the compulsory pooling
order toward all concerned, the compulsory pooling law, with its avowed purposes of avoiding the drilling of unnecessary wells, of protecting correlative
rights and of preventing waste, should continue to serve the cause of petroleum
conservation in New Mexico.

64. In some instances, applications for pooling were denied folowing an examiner
hearing. But they were granted following hearing de novo before the Commission
where it appeared that additional efforts to lease or communitize had been made in
the interim. See, e.g., Southwest Prod. Co., Case Nos. 2415, 2416, 2446 and 2453 (N.M.
Oil Conservation Comm'n 1962).

